BORO Foundational Ontology’s Meta-ontological Choices Foundational Ontologies and their Meta-ontological Choices Onto.Com Background An extensional ontology for business systems BORO Applications BORO was originally developed to legacy re-engineer financial business systems. BORO has been applied in various industrial sectors including finance, oil and gas, and defence BORO inspired the upper level ontology of the International Defence Enterprise Architecture Specification for exchange Group (IDEAS) IDEAS currently underpins the U.S. Department of Defense Architecture Framework ( DoDAF ) Work is currently underway to incorporate IDEAS into the U.K. Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework (MODAF) An early version of BORO inspired ISO 15926 for data integration and exchange in the oil and gas industry Title: “ Industrial automation systems and integration—Integration of life-cycle data for process plants including oil and gas production facilities” 3 2010 BORO Applications - broad timeline 1990 Ongoing BORO development 2000 ISO 15926 : Part 2 IDEAS DODAF DM2 MODEM OMG UPDM Original source - book 5 Partridge C (1996) Business Objects: Re - Engineering for re - use. Butterworth Heinemann, Oxford BORO Methodology Foundational ontology and methodology developed hand in hand. Initial methodology was aimed at a systematic process for re-engineering business information systems. Developing the ontology for the development process. Current methodology ( bCLEARer ) has been extended to include harvesting information from less structured sources; including excel spreadsheets and documents. Architectural view Current methodology - bCLEARer A context for metaphysical choices Providing a context Provide a context by Explaining how meta-ontological choices influence information systems and how they underpin foundational ontologies Showing some meta-ontological choices, so you can see what they are How meta-ontological choices influence information systems and how they underpin foundational ontologies Structure of the explanation: Large and complex information systems benefit from a good ontological architecture Foundational ontologies aim to provide the ontological architecture A foundational ontology’s nature and structure is driven by its metaphysical choices Architecture Used in a variety of senses Typically some form of framework for organising Example architecture - Software “The architecture of a software system defines that system in terms of computational components and interactions among those components.” Software Architecture; Shaw & Garlan ; Prentice Hall, 1996 A particular software architecture framework will identify the types of computational components and interactions Foundational categorical ontology A foundational ontology can be defined as an ontology that: “defines a range of top-level domain-independent ontological categories, which form a general foundation for more elaborated domain-specific ontologies” ( Guizzardi and Wagner, 2004). A categorical foundational ontology is one where the ontological categories are (reasonably) complete. Everything that exists should fit under one or more of the categories. These top level categories can be seen as organising components of the architecture of the ontological zone. One example would be the categories; universals and particulars. Not crisply clearly defining metaphysics No real agreement on a crisp clear definition of metaphysics “I confess that characterizing metaphysics as the systematic study of the most fundamental structure of reality hardly sounds very precise. But I am not offering a definition, imprecision in which would indeed be a defect. I do not think it would be at all profitable to pursue a definition of 'metaphysics', because the danger would be that it would be framed in a way which favoured one metaphysical position over others—for instance, in a way which presumed the reality of space, or of causation, when the reality of these things may be denied by some metaphysical systems.” E. J. Lowe – The Possibility of Metaphysics – p. 2 Unavoidability of metaphysics It is a commonplace in metaphysics that one necessarily makes metaphysical choices – the question is whether one is aware of it “Find a scientific man who proposes to get along without any metaphysics and you have found one whose doctrines are thoroughly vitiated by the crude and uncriticized metaphysics with which they are packed. We must philosophize, said the great naturalist Aristotle -- if only to avoid philosophizing. Every man of us has a metaphysics, and has to have one; and it will influence his life greatly. Far better, then, that that metaphysics should be criticized and not be allowed to run loose.” Principles of Philosophy - 1.129 in Collected Papers, Volume 1 - Charles Sanders Peirce “ … science presupposes metaphysics … Scientists inevitably make metaphysical assumptions, whether explicitly or implicitly, in proposing and testing their theories—assumptions which go beyond anything that science itself can legitimate. These assumptions need to be examined critically, whether by scientists themselves or by philosophers” p. 5 - The possibility of metaphysics – E. J. Lowe Information systems will contain metaphysical positions The question is whether someone is aware of them and has examined them critically ... Aristotle’s conception of metaphysics as a perfectly general discipline, I said that a central aim of such a discipline is the identification and characterization of the categories under which things fall . It would not be far off the mark to say this is what metaphysics as it is understood these days aims at. ... But just what is it to identify the categories under which things fall? As I indicated earlier, Aristotle took the categories to be the highest or most general kinds under which things can be classified . This suggests that what metaphysicians do is to take all the things there are and sort them into the most general kinds under which they fall. ... It would seem, then, that if they are to identify the highest kinds, metaphysicians should seek out the most general answers to the “What is it?” question. One way it might seem they might do this is to take a familiar object like Socrates and pose the question “What is he?” The obvious answer is “A human being.” But while ‘human being’ picks out a kind under which Socrates falls, there are more general answers to the question “What kind of thing is Socrates?” He is, after all, a primate, a mammal, a vertebrate, and an animal. To identify the category to which Socrates belongs is to identify the terminus or endpoint in this list of ever more general answers to the “What is it?” question . And when do we have that? The standard reply is that we arrive at the category of a thing when we arrive at an answer to the “What is it?” question such that the only more general answer is given by a term like ‘entity,’ ‘being,’ ‘thing,‘ or ’existent’ that applies to everything that there is. Aristotle thought that the relevant answer for Socrates is given by the term ‘substance,’ so Aristotle took substance to be the category under which Socrates and other living beings fall. ... Provided they choose their sample objects in a way that is sensitive to the differences among things, they will find themselves arriving at new and different categories. At some point, however, they will find that no new categories emerge. Repeating the procedure just brings them back to categories they have already isolated. At that point, they can be confident, subject to normal concerns about the adequacy of inductive procedures, that they have identified all the highest kinds or categories of being. Foundational ontology and metaphysics have similar goals Both foundational ontologies and metaphysics focus on the general categories (of existence). How does philosophy characterise the different metaphysics? Metaphysics through the eyes of philosophy textbooks Exhibit 1 – concerns and choices modality identity particulars time universals universals - realism universals - nominalism Exhibit 2 – choices, choices, choices 3-dimensionalism 4-dimensionalism no abstract objects abstract objects tensed time tenseless time “It is our choices, Harry, that show what we truly are …” ― J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets “We are our choices.” ― Jean-Paul Sartre Characterising with choices These textbooks show there are: common general themes and common choices Both useful, but choice offer a mechanism for characterisation made this not that choice Some relevant (?) metaphysical choices {5C22544A-7EE6-4342-B048-85BDC9FD1C3A} Endurantism Perdurantism Existence. Change. Eternalism Presentism Existence. Change. Space-time Space and Time Change. Modally Extended Modally Flat Modality/Possibility. Counterparts. First Order Universals Only Higher Order Universals Existence. Universals – Metaphysical Realism Universals – Nominalism Identity. Can two different universals have the same extension? Particulars – Extensional Identity Particulars - Coincident Identity. Incudes mereology. Materialism Non-Materialism (Abstract) Existence. Branching Time Linear Time Existence. Possibility. Categorical ontology Non-categorical ontology Complete – or incomplete - top level Partridge C (2002) Note: A Couple of Meta-Ontological Choices for Ontological Architectures. LADSEB CNR, Padova , Italy Stefano Borgo , Aldo Gangemi, Nicola Guarino , Claudio Masolo , Oltramari A (2002) WonderWeb Deliverable D15: Ontology RoadMap . Ontology Infrastructure for the Semantic Web. Laboratory For Applied Ontology - ISTCCNR, Trento Masolo C, Borgo S, Gangemi A, Guarino N, Oltramari A (2003) WonderWeb Deliverable D18: Ontology Library. Ontology Infrastructure for the Semantic Web. Laboratory For Applied Ontology - ISTC-CNR, Trento Semy SK, Pulvermacher MK, Obrst LJ (2004) Toward the Use of an Upper Ontology for U.S. Government and U.S. Military Domains: An Evaluation. The MITRE Corporation, Bedford, Massachusetts BORO’s metaphysical choices BORO’s choices {5C22544A-7EE6-4342-B048-85BDC9FD1C3A} BORO’s Choice Description Endurantism bodies are typically temporally extended through time Eternalism no privileged present Space-time a single space-time continuum Modally Flat modality managed through counterparts in possible worlds Higher Order Universals universals can be instances of other universals Universals – Nominalism (member) extension is the criterion of identity Particulars – Extensional Identity ( spatio -temporal) extension is the criterion of identity Materialism no abstract objects Linear Time time does not branch Internal dependencies One can be constrained by the relationship between the choices. Some metaphysical choices sit more easily with others. For example, among philosophers Presentistism and Endurantism go hand in hand, as do Eternalism and Perdurantism . BORO follows the latter pair. So BORO does not go against the grain here. Intersubjectively Reliable Identity Criteria In science, one does not expect different scientists to get different results when reproducing experiments. Unfortunately, in practice, expert domain modellers often have fundamental disagreements about the objects in the domain. Reconciling these is a well-known management challenge in domain model projects. What is needed is criteria of identity, mechanisms for understanding identity and difference – part of the topic ‘identity’ we mentioned earlier. Typically, a foundational ontology will have something to say on these. A more stringent (and potentially more useful) desideratum is intersubjectively reliable criteria of identity; a mechanism that different people can use to reliably arrive at and agree upon the same result. This is not a new idea. Quine worried about this reliability question, and this motivated his metaphysical choices, Decock ( Decock , 2002, p. 93) explores this in some detail. Choosing Intersubjectively Reliable Identity Criteria BORO makes similar choices to Quine for similar reasons. For example, Quine (like BORO) selects materialism to avoid abstract objects which are notoriously difficult to agree on. Like Quine, BORO settles on a four-dimensional spatio -temporal extensional criteria of identity. Unlike Quine (but like Lewis) BORO chooses modally flat possible worlds. Like Quine, BORO’s types are extensional. So this single concern has motivated most of the choices. Top level patterns BORO Top Level and Whole-Parts Pattern Other Foundational Patterns Re-engineering the companies house data examples of names of the company examples of company events example of a classification of business activities example of a company state Company Director Alan Sugar Alan Sugar’s spatiotemporal extent space time world A Alan Sugar AS1 = Alan Sugar as Director of Amserve Limited (19/4/2000 – 30/6/2008) APP1 = Alan Sugar’s appointment as Director of Amserve Limited TERM1= Alan Sugar’s termination as Director of Amserve Limited 19/4/00 3/8/01 APP1 TERM1 space time AS1 world A Alan Sugar AS2 = Alan Sugar as Director of Amsprop Properties Limited (3/8/2001 – 30/6/2009) APP2 = Alan Sugar’s appointment as Director of Amsprop Properties Limited TERM2 = Alan Sugar’s termination as Director of Amsprop Properties Limited 30/6/09 APP2 TERM2 3/8/01 space time AS2 world A Alan Sugar 30/6/09 APP1 APP2 TERM1 TERM2 19/4/00 3/8/01 30/6/08 AS1 AS2 space time From 3/8/01 to 30/6/08 Alan Sugar has both directorships (is director of both companies). world A space time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 How many objects? world A 9 Counting (ontic) commitment style.visibility style.visibility style.visibility style.visibility style.visibility style.visibility style.visibility style.visibility style.visibility Company A simple (simplistic?) process What is the object company? Is it a type? Does it have instances? Yes Therefore it is type If it is a type we start with the instances Find an instance of the type company Company 02410731 Is Company 02410731 a type? Does it have instances? No Therefore it is an element What is the spatiotemporal extent of company? Many types of company events space time INC AR1 TERM1 AA1 DISS Company as a fusion of spatiotemporal ’events’ APP1 Company 2410731 world A Does this adequately individuate this company? Incorporation – 2/8/89 (INC) Directors’ appointments (e.g., on 16/4/10 – APP1) Directors’ terminations (e.g., on 13/4/10 – TERM1) Dissolution (11/1/12 – DISS) Filing of annual return (e.g., 9/10/90 – AR1) Filing of annual accounts (e.g., 9/10/90 – AA1) Company is a first-order type with element members 2410731 Companies space time 30/6/09 9/10/89 2/8/89 NS2 NS1 NC1 Company 02410731 changes its name from Cursitor (Thirty-Eight) Limited to Amserve Ltd. on 9/10/89 (NC1) Name States of Company 02410731 NS1: Cursitor (Thirty-Eight) Limited from 2/8/89 to 9/10/89 NS2: Amserve Ltd. from 9/10/89 to 30/6/09 world A NS2 30/6/09 NC1 DISS 9/10/89 space time 2410731 NS1 Company 02410731 changes its name from Cursitor (Thirty-Eight) Limited to Amserve Ltd. on 9/10/89 (NC1) Name States of Company 02410731 NS1: Cursitor (Thirty-Eight) Limited from 2/8/89 to 9/10/89 NS2: Amserve Ltd. from 9/10/89 to 30/6/09 INC 2/8/89 world A Higher order types Higher-Order Types Ubiquitous (Odell, 1995; Partridge et al. 2016) Typically significant proportion of business systems reference data Simplest way of dealing with it is to choose to have higher-order types in the foundational ontology In this dataset the Standard Industry Classification is an example UK Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities (SIC) (2007) E tc. …..................... E tc. …..................... Economic Activities Section A Section B Section C Section U Section … Divisions Division 01 Division 02 Division 03 Groups 59.11 Classes 10.1 10.2 … Example coding: Video Production Activities: 59112 (Section J), Division 59, Group 59.1, Class 59.11, Subclass 59.11/2 59.11 59.12 59.13 SIC Taxonomy Economic Activities 59112 59113 74100 74202 State of Company 07382018 Sets deriving from the SIC classification are not disjoint In this example a company’s state multiply instantiates different sections, divisions, groups, classes and subclasses